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Abstract 
According to the textbook approach, the developmental states of the Far East have been 
considered as strong and autonomous entities. Although their bureaucratic elites have 
remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, the state capacity has also 
been utilised in order to allocate resources in the interest of the whole society. Yet, society – 
by and large –has remained weak and subordinated to the state elite. On the other hand, the 
general perception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been just the opposite. The violent and 
permanent conflict amongst rent-seeking groups for influence and authority over resources 
has culminated in a situation where states have become extremely weak and fragmented, 
while society – depending on the capacity of competing groups for mobilising resources to 
organise themselves mostly on a regional or local level (resulting in local petty kingdoms) – 
has never had the chance to evolve as a strong player. State failure in the literature, therefore, 
– in the context of SSA – refers not just to a weak and captured state but also to a non-
functioning, and sometimes even non-existent society, too. 
 
Recently, however, the driving forces of globalisation might have triggered serious changes in 
the above described status quo. Accordingly, our hypothesis is the following: globalisation, 
especially the dynamic changes of technology, capital and communication have made the 
simplistic “strong state–weak society” (in Asia) and “weak state–weak society” (in Africa) 
categorisation somewhat obsolete.  
 
While our comparative study has a strong emphasis on the empirical scrutiny of trying to 
uncover the dynamics of changes in state–society relations in the two chosen regions both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, it also aims at complementing the meaning and essence of the 
concepts and methodology of stateness, state capacity and state-society relations, the well-
known building blocks of the seminal works of Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), Migdal (1988) 
or Myrdal (1968). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the lack of market institutions, most of the newly independent colonial countries 
expected the start of economic development and wealth accumulation (often referred to as the 
“big push”) from the state (or more specifically the government).1 The first generation of 
development economists argued accordingly that whereas developed industrialised countries 
could lean on both the coordination mechanisms of the market (to a larger extent) and the 
state (to a lesser extent) in their advancement, the so-called late-comers could not rely upon 
the former. Thus, changes should have been promoted and sustained in principle by the state 
solely (Meier 2001: 14-15).2 The missing or incomplete markets, along with the abundance of 
market failures, made the idea of state activeness rather attractive in the developing world. 
The state was expected to be responsible for the accumulation of physical capital, the creation 
of infrastructure, the development of agriculture (and consequently the relief of undernutrition 
and famine), the absorption of labour supply, the provision of education, etc.3  
 
The state was envisaged by the economics profession (both mainstream and non-mainstream) 
as a closed, unitary entity, which – in principle – should simply set the target lines and find 
the appropriate tools for changing the economic environment. The idea of a “benevolent 
social planner” referred to an agent who was able to recognise under all circumstances what 
the country’s interest was and how this interest could be best implemented. The social planner 
functioned thus as a kind of instrumental actor who did not follow its own interest; instead, it 
worked exclusively for the benefit of the whole community.4
 
Retrospectively, it seems evident by now that both professional economists and policymakers 
were wrong in their naive belief with regard to the omnipotence of the state. Paradoxically, 
the state was expected to deliver unprecedented results in countries where this newly 
established entity itself had hardly any experience in achieving a successful transformation of 
the whole economy and society. Such a misperception of the state was, in fact, part of the 
explanation why the bulk of former colonies failed to catch up to the club of developed 
countries. Trying to solve this puzzle, the second generation of development economists, who 
returned to the credo of neoclassical economics, claimed that it was the failed public and 
economic policy which caused the fiasco.5  
 
However, policies themselves are endogenous, too, in the sense that they are the result of a 
decision-making process which is constrained by several factors that include the diverging 
interests of a high number of actors. The paper argues accordingly that the great number of 
failures is not simply the result of failed public policies, but the inappropriately interpreted 
role of the state, and the lack of knowledge and capacity for managing the development 
process – in short, the “weakness” of the state. We share the view of Joel Migdal (1988:10-
11) who argued that there was a strong association between the weakness and corruptness of 
                                                 
1 See especially the work of Rosenstein-Rodan (1961). 
2 Even the birth of development economics itself was due to the fact that the change from the state of 
underdevelopment to a modern economy required a new, specific discipline which was sensitive to the troubles 
and needs of the developing countries and applied a holistic and interdisciplinary approach (Todaro 1997). 
3 The most well-known concept was developed by Nehru and was referred to as the consensus of the Indian 
Congress Party (see especially Waelbroeck 1998). 
4 Additionally, according to this view, the state operated in a vacuum, independently of the direct and indirect 
effects of society, culture, history, etc. 
5 See especially the reasoning of Krueger (1993), who pointed out that while market failures were taken into 
account quite seriously in the developing world, no such attitude prevailed in relation to the state or government 
failures.  
the public sector and the state administration on the one hand and the failed development path 
on the other hand in the least developed countries. In our analysis, however, we will contrast 
the poor development performance of the least developed countries (focusing on Sub-Saharan 
Africa exclusively) with the success stories of East and Southeast Asia, countries which 
started their miraculous economic transformation from the same level of development on 
which the African countries were at that time and which now belong to either the group of 
advanced industrialised countries (the NICs) or the middle income group (Southeast Asia).  
 
Concentrating on the post World War II development path of these two regions (Africa and 
Asia), we would like to unfold what were the determining factors which made it possible for 
some countries to join the group of developed countries, while others failed in this quest. In 
searching for the relevant answer we go beyond economic analyses and rely on the concepts 
and methodologies of comparative political science and sociology, and modify the research 
question accordingly as to why only a few countries succeeded in establishing the institutional 
setup of “strong” states, thereby creating fruitful, sustainable state-society relations, while 
other ruling elites failed to do so.  
 
Since our ultimate aim is to understand what role the state played in the success of East and 
Southeast Asia and why the same results were not delivered by Sub-Saharan Africa, the first 
task is to conceptualise the state – part 2 offers just this. In part 3, the main characteristics of 
the Asian developmental states will be collected. In part 4, the failed development path of 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will be reflected upon. In part 5, we ask the question whether there 
is a chance for countries in SSA to become successful developmental states? Part 6 concludes 
the paper.  
 
 
2. Conceptualising the state 
 
From relatively early on, pluralist theories considered the state as no more than an arena of the 
constant struggle among competing groups. Public policy was, therefore, the result of the 
complex net of competition, conflict and compromise. The dominant perception of politics 
was that the institutionalised competition served the interest of the general public well. 
Compromise and conflict-resolution was seen as an integral part of political life, which also 
enhanced general welfare. In fact, it was the struggle itself that made it impossible for any 
group to grasp power for a longer time and to impose its will on the minority permanently.  
 
Public choice theory, however, departed significantly from the normative statements of early 
pluralist theories and claimed instead that the state could be best interpreted as a kind of 
transfer state. The ultimate goal of the constant struggle of individuals (voters for instance) 
and groups (such as various lobbies) is the capture of distributional sources and – eventually – 
political/economic power (Buchanan et al. 1980).6 Nothing can guarantee, therefore, that first-
best policies would always be adopted by politicians. What might be desirable in case of a 
benevolent social planner might not be attainable at all in reality. “Even if economists do have 
ideas for appropriate policies – even if they do agree on what has gone wrong and how to put 
it right – will government policy makers listen to them?” asked Meier (1995:579), thereby 
grasping the contradiction between normative economics on the one hand and real-world 
                                                 
6 Politicians who represent the state are, in turn, not searching for the best available policy while making policy 
choices, because they are also interested in maximizing their own net payoffs. In fact, the wealth status and the 
survival of politicians depend largely on how appropriately they can satisfy the demands of different societal 
forces. 
phenomena on the other hand. In fact, the ultimate bottleneck in economic development may 
not be good public policy but good (enlightened) politics (Grindle 1991).7
 
While pluralists theories – along with Marxist theories – considered the state as a non-
coherent, non-unitary actor which is not capable of defining and pursuing its own interests, 
based on the historic experience of the industrialisation of advanced countries, Polányi (1947) 
and Gerschenkron (1962) claimed the necessity to investigate the (focal) role of the state in 
market creation and economic development relatively early on. Nevertheless, it was only the 
seventies and the eighties which witnessed a breakthrough in the scrutiny of the state. 
Bringing back the state into the social sciences has been indeed a relatively new phenomenon, 
as compared to the enormous interest shown towards the study of social forces in politics and 
especially policy.  
 
The growing size of the public sector in democratic countries, along with the successful 
development strategies of some Asian countries (the so-called newly industrialised 
economies), however, made it inevitable to redefine the state both as an independent actor 
with its own goals and also as a society-shaping entity. In this new approach, the state had 
become able to structure not just the relationship between civil society and the state but also 
within society (Stepan 1985). The passive state had been replaced by an active one, which was 
not considered anymore as simply an arena for competing interests but as an institutionalised 
structure. The state, thus, was able to institute policies without the consent of its governed 
society. Skocpol (1985:9) rephrased this elegantly as the following: “states conceived as 
organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals 
that are not simply reflective of the demands or interest of social groups, classes or society.”  
 
The new understanding of the state, however, required new concepts and methods as well. 
Consequently, state-centred approaches turned to on the phenomena of state capacity and 
autonomy. In strong contrast to the former pluralist and Marxist theories, where societal 
forces were more able to shape the state (and policy) than the degree to which the state could 
influence society’s behaviour, the so-called statist theories claimed that the state did have 
enough autonomy to define its own goals and to transform them into policy choices; and also 
that the state possessed the capacity to control the society and to implement its goals.8
 
Importantly, the concept of state autonomy does not claim that the government should work 
and exist in total isolation from societal forces. Evans (1995) argued that states also need to 
establish linkages to the relevant social actors, which in return could support the state’s vision 
and policies on development. The term “embedded autonomy” thus refers to a situation where 
it becomes possible for a country to avoid rent-seeking and capture – a real threat in countries 
where isolated states do not receive feedback from their societies. In successful nations, the 
link between the leaders and the society is provided by a competent bureaucracy in practice. 
 
                                                 
7 It seems that economics (public choice and positive political economy) is successful in identifying the reasons 
of past failures, but it does not tell us much on how to implement future good policies. 
8 Applying the concepts of Theda Skocpol, state autonomy refers to a situation where the state can formulate its 
own goals and interests independently from the rest of society and policies are determined in turn solely by the 
state. State capacity on the other hand describes the ability of putting the chosen policy into practice (getting 
them implemented) (Skocpol 1985:9). State capacity is a determining factor in whether the state is able to 
enforce its will or not; and for what kind of relationship has been instituted within the state machinery – not just 
within the executive or the administrative staff but also between the rulers and the appointed bureaucrats 
(Grindle and Thomas 1991). 
In case of the statist approaches the challenge is to discover and understand how the state 
organises itself and structures the society, and, moreover, what motivates the agents within 
the state in their decisions. The term “autonomy” gains true meaning only if it is applied in 
the context of state actors. In practical terms, a state is considered to be autonomous if both 
the political elites and the bureaucrats are able to act independently from societal forces.9 
Ideally, public policies are invented and designed directly by the ruling elites. Moreover, 
elites working in isolation from vested interests can work effectively for the nation’s 
interest.10 An autonomous state, thus, is not simply the reflection of the needs of its citizens, 
because it can use its capacity and relative autonomy to conduct a strict control over state 
resources and it can monopolize the supply of certain goods and services.11
 
As far as the bureaucrats are concerned, two opposing views prevail in the literature. On the 
one hand, public choice theory assumes that bureaucrats – just like any other individual – are 
interested in maximising their own utility, which ends up in an ever-increasing budget they 
preside over. The sub-optimal allocation of resources is the result of the continuous rivalry 
among actors within the hierarchical structure of the state. People working in the state 
administration are rent-seeker individuals, whose goal is to capture the consumer surplus by 
monopolising public decisions (see especially Mueller 1989 or Niskanen 1971). As opposed 
to this, statist approaches emphasise that bureaucrats also have non-selfish goals; that is, they 
are willing to work for the public good. The Weberian bureaucrat works hard and obeys the 
rules because he/she will be rewarded by his/her superior in return. Prestige and income are 
the functions of the abilities and commitment of the individual and not that of rent-seeking 
activities.12
 
 
3. The East Asian developmental states 
 
The Asian developmental states are possibly the most evident examples of a successful 
transformation in the third world. The explanations, however, differ largely. On the one 
extreme (which has become the dominant view in the economic literature), scholars put the 
emphasis on the outward oriented growth strategy along with the relative openness of the 
countries and the lack or early suspension of protectionist measures (see Balassa 1981). These 
authors do not deny the fact that Asian countries applied different industrial and trade 
policies, but the importance of these policies were strongly questioned. On the other side, 
Amsden (1989) or Wade (1990) claimed that trade openness was simply one (although 
important) part of the success story of these countries. The crucial factor was properly defined 
state policy which was quite often selective and biased towards certain industries or even 
companies. The “appropriateness” of policies, however, required such a state elite and 
administration which were aware of the long term needs of their countries and had a clear 
vision about their development path. The Asian developmental states were accordingly 
                                                 
9 In the initiation phase of policy, “autonomy” refers to the discretionary authority of state elites, while in the 
consolidation phase the term refers to the capacity of the bureaucracy in controlling recruitment, defining its 
mission and the “boundaries governing relations with social groups” (Evans 1995:24). 
10 Krasner (1978) equates state interest with national interest (where “national” is not simply the sum of 
individuals’ preferences). 
11 In public choice theory, however, the state in its extremist form may behave as a Leviathan (see Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980). 
12 While in earlier works the ultimate task of the bureaucracy was to manage resources efficiently in order to 
provide appropriate armed security for the state (Tilly 1985), Amsden (1985) and Wade (1990) showed that 
successful countries such as Taiwan converted themselves into development states by having used the 
bureaucracy to extract resources from the society thereby pursuing economic goals instead of security ones. 
entrepreneurs which possessed the relevant degree of autonomy and capacity, by which they 
could define their goals and could implement their policies.  
 
In the context of developmental states, Wade (1990) argued that success was strongly 
connected to the ability of the states to define long term economic goals and to allocate 
resource in the desired way. Studying the Korean development record, Amsden (1989) 
claimed that the success of transforming the economy and the society depended basically on 
the strength of the state. She coined the term “strength” with the very same meaning of what 
Skocpol called capacity; that is, a strong state was defined as the one which “is capable of 
implementing its own policies” (Amsden 1989:147). Consequently, she stated that “countries 
are ‘backward’ mostly because their state is weak” (ibid. 147).  
 
Generally speaking, in the Asian developmental states the interests of the ruling elite 
coincided with the long term interest of the country, as economic development was perceived 
as an overarching goal. This, however, was not due to the altruism of the elite, but rather to 
the fact that they realised how much they could gain by actively supporting economic 
development. The elite also recognised that development fostered the loyalty of citizens and 
thus it gave a certain degree of legitimacy to their rule. There was also a clear sense of 
economic nationalism, which was reinforced by historical experiences and security-related 
motivations (Stubbs 2005). 
 
In East and Southeast Asia, the ruling elite were a relatively closed caste composed of senior 
politicians and bureaucrats. They had close relations with the executive head of the country, 
whose personality determined basically whether a culture of development emerged or not.13  
 
Importantly, the elite (or the state itself) were capable of formulating economic policies 
relatively independently from the interests of various societal groups. Day-to-day 
management of the economy was done by the bureaucracy, and the elite (politicians) took on 
the task of maintaining the insulation of the bureaucracy (Johnson 1982). External interests 
(rent-seeking activities) were firmly countered by the authoritarian rulers, which led to a lack 
of pluralism. Yet, the developmental state hardly abused its autonomy. 
 
Nevertheless, the autonomy of the state did not mean isolation. “Embedded autonomy” 
prevailed in these countries, which maintained a dense web of ties between the state and the 
non-state sectors through which the bureaucracy was able to coordinate and manage the 
economy (Leftwich 1995:408). This relative autonomy allowed the state to formulate clear 
rules and priorities and to manage the private sector accordingly. The embedded autonomy of 
the state helped the flow of information and the building of trust. In developed market 
economies, it is mainly the price mechanism (the market) which coordinates the economy, as 
the prices reflect all available information on the market and thus provide signals and 
incentives for the actors (Hayek 1995). In the Southeast Asian developmental states, the 
network of personal relationships played the dominant role in coordination. 
 
Yet, without a well-trained, Weberian-type bureaucracy, not even the most enlightened elite 
could have achieved the miraculous performance in Asia. The developmental states 
consciously created bureaucratic institutions which channelled the opinions and interests of 
                                                 
13 Such leaders include general Park Chung Hee in South Korea, prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, 
Sukarno and later Suharto in Indonesia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak and Manathir bin Mohamad in 
Malaysia.  
the private sector towards the ruling elite, who strived to take these bottom-up signals into 
account in their final decisions (Johnson 1982).  
 
What differentiates the bureaucracies of the East and Southeast Asian developmental states 
from the planning institutions in other developing countries was not just their insulation, but 
also the fact that they exercised true power. Only highly trained professionals had a chance of 
entering the bureaucracy.14 These people shared the vision of the ruling elite concerning the 
modernisation of their country.15 The executive heads of the developmental states were aided 
by various planning and developmental committees as well, which laid out the desired 
directions of development and elaborated detailed economic plans. Usually two ministries 
played decisive roles: the Ministry of Finance, as the institution responsible for the budget and 
economic stability, and the Ministry of the Economy, in charge of growth and structural 
adjustment. Moreover, the Central Bank, responsible for keeping inflation low and adjusting 
the money supply to the needs of the economy, was also crucial in the success. 
 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore boasted the most successful bureaucracies. These were 
the countries where financial compensation of the bureaucracy was also the highest. The 
changes of 1961 in South Korea brought with them the separation of the economic and 
political elite (even at the cost of expropriations). In the new system personal competence and 
performance became the most important criteria for determining the salaries in the 
bureaucracy (as in the Weberian ideals).16 Some Southeast Asian countries however, such as 
Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia were not so successful in insulating the bureaucracy. The 
reason was the relatively low number of domestic companies and the dominance of 
multinationals. Usually the bureaucracy had only limited influence on the latter (MacIntyre 
and Jayasuriya 1995).  
 
It must be added, however, that the ruling elite and a competent bureaucracy could work in 
relative autonomy from societal forces, only because the latter were weak during the first 
waves of catching up (Luiz 2000).17 State power and autonomy were consolidated before 
national or foreign capital interests became influential (Leftwich 1995). At the start of 
economic development, the private sector, as well as the civil society, was still weak, or in 
some cases they were outright repressed.18 In fact, in East and Southeast Asia, it was the state 
that facilitated the birth and expansion of the private sector, having the chance to shape 
ownership structures and the main foci of activities (Amsden 1989). Using an analogy from 
                                                 
14 See the “Berkeley Mafia” in Indonesia. 
15 It is true that the competence and success of the economic bureaucracy have not been even in all Southeast 
Asian countries. Perhaps the cases of Thailand and Malaysia are the most clear cut exceptions. The 
bureaucracies in these two countries are weaker and less competent than those of the others, mainly because the 
army and the public service have been in continuous conflict with the executive apparatus. This was caused by 
the presence of strong interest groups. The institutions in these countries were much less imbedded and depended 
to a much larger degree on those in power. True technocrats did not emerge. 
16 Although salaries were not as high in the state administration as in the private sector, countless other 
incentives were also used. The effects of life long employment should not to be underestimated either. 
Amakudari, or the golden parachute, used in Japan, was also employed in other countries, such as Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia. 
17 Either the civil society was weak to begin with, or the authoritarian governments intentionally weakened it 
(see the case of China or Indonesia). 
18 This is an important factor, as in regions like Latin America, where landowners and foreign companies had 
strong power over the state, the government was never capable of executing any kind of large scale 
transformation. 
game theory, the state was the leader and the private sector the follower.19 This resulted in a 
close relationship between the state and the private sector. 
 
Accordingly, no non-state organisation was able to break, or even threaten, the power of the 
state, and the ruling elite made sure that no such organisation emerged. In the “weak state – 
strong state” dichotomy of Myrdal (1968), this meant that the state was strong enough to 
contain (or even destroy) all those social forces, interest groups, institutions and customs 
which inhibited modernisation and economic growth.20 Although developmental states did 
frequently violate civil rights, they still did not have such a terrible track record as most Sub-
Saharan African countries or other developing nations. Somewhat surprisingly, the increasing 
levels of welfare did not simply legitimise these regimes, but also made them rather popular 
among citizens.21
 
 
4. Failed development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Evidently, following the break-up of the colonial rule, the newly born states of Sub-Saharan 
Africa were eagerly looking for ambitious plans in order to ensure the political and economic 
independence of their countries, on the one hand, and to provide a decent life for their 
citizens, on the other. Still, while governments were strongly engaged in promising a quick 
and successful catching up and a better-off status on the level of individuals and the country 
alike, in reality, they hardly managed to succeed. In fact, the weak incumbents were not able 
to rule and shape their social environment; instead, the latter captured the state and totally 
dismantled it in a relatively short period of time. Applying the concepts of the statist view, the 
real difference between the successful developmental states of East Asia and the failed 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa was the lack of state autonomy to define goals and policies 
and the missing state capacity to implement the set targets (that is, the non-existence of a 
capable bureaucracy).  
 
In fact, the elite in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa seemed to have rather different attitudes 
and motivations. Some of the characteristics of the elite observed in the Asian developmental 
states were undoubtedly present in Sub-Saharan Africa, too. The presence of a strong 
(sometimes violent) executive head, authoritarianism and the heavy influence of the military 
were undeniable in both cases. The most important difference, however, was that in a typical 
Sub-Saharan African country the interests of the elite and the state diverged evidently. Instead 
of maximising the country’s growth potential, the elite engaged in widespread redistribution 
activities in order to gain support and maintain their power, but also for their own enrichment. 
                                                 
19 Once again, Thailand and Indonesia are exceptions. In these countries, and especially in Thailand, the private 
sector was already relatively strong at the time of the economic take off. Malaysia is also a bit different as the 
government consciously implemented economic policies to favour the bumiputras (the majority of the Malaysian 
population) against the Chinese minority who composed the economic elite. 
20 The state could hardly be characterised as an arena of rival interest groups, as it was the case in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for instance. Admittedly, many Asian nations employed the police or the secret services to monitor and 
control civil society initiatives. Nevertheless, in order to counterbalance the various forms of social repression, 
the state also provided an increase in the level of living standards on a constant basis. Especially in East Asian 
countries, the labour force was weak and unorganised, and in rural areas the state managed to gain supporters by 
distributing land. The future and prosperity of the entrepreneurial class depended heavily on the benevolence of 
the state (especially during the first decades of industrialisation). 
21 All Asian countries put a special emphasis on increasing the quality of health services, increasing school 
enrolment ratios, developing infrastructure and housing and eradicating hunger. These positive changes have 
caused many positive externalities, too, such as better health and education, which, in turn, strengthened the 
capabilities of people, undoubtedly contributing to the increase in  productivity. 
Promoting development, while extremely important in rhetoric, remained only secondary in 
practice. The state was de facto privatised: the power of the ruling elite faced few constraints 
and the exploitation of public and private resources for the gains of the elite was deeply 
embedded in institutionalised practices (Eifert – Gelb – Tallroth 2002).  
 
Importantly, a state cannot be regarded “strong” just because in principle it can possess plenty 
of resources (in the form of tax or tariff revenues or rents from the export of natural resources, 
for instance). The ultimate question of state strength is whether the state is able to use these 
resources in order to attain its set targets, or do different societal forces block it (Migdal 
1988). Furthermore, the state needs its own agents who deliver the targeted outcome. Societal 
actors, however, can seriously threaten or damage the authority of the incumbents as they 
grow strong. Most of the governments of the developing countries are, therefore, “weak”, 
because local authorities create their own “states” and make the people living under their 
authority loyal to them at any cost. The central authority has no other choice than to agree on 
a compromise with such regional/local groups (or with some of them at least). The centre has 
to surrender parts of its resources, thereby ensuring relative tranquillity and peace. The 
fragmented social structure may create a stable but low level equilibrium.22
 
In Africa, however, the state was not receptive of the needs of the society, instead, only the 
ruling elite and some groups connected to them had an access to state resources. Accordingly, 
the state failed to offer the prospect of a better well-being, which has led to the high level of 
discontent among the members of the society. Some of these societal (mainly ethnic) groups, 
led by the rival elite, were able to organise themselves and, using armed force, strived to 
capture the state, as they saw this as the only way of getting the state to act according to their 
interests. The state, as mentioned earlier, was too weak in Africa to counter these threats, and, 
therefore, it became a battleground for rival social groups. 
 
In the East Asian case, the ruling elite sought to maintain their power by creating popular 
support through economic development and increasing the well-being of the citizens. In 
Africa, however, those in power were continuously threatened by the rival elite, who also felt 
inspired to gain a share from the spoils of the state. In fact, elites have been organised along 
ethnic lines in typical Sub-Saharan countries, whose relationship was often shaped by a long 
history of animosity.23 The lack of trust and the problem of commitment were both able to 
create a strong sense of uncertainty among the members of the ruling elite. In such unstable 
political systems, promoting long term economic growth in order to establish a strong popular 
support and legitimacy was not perceived to be a viable strategy. Instead, the elite in power 
attempted to buy support by building client networks (Hyden 1983). In the context of ethnic 
loyalties (and the absence of a free press), such patronage politics could be more cost 
effective for the elite to maintain their power than the provision of public services (Collier 
2007:45). Redistributing state incomes to important societal groups such as the military, the 
local business elite, tribes and ethnic groups close to the ruling elite, while at the same time 
repressing groups which support the rival elite has become the norm in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries. 24
                                                 
22 Migdal (1998) called it the “state in society” scenario. More recently, the terms “failed state” or, in the 
extreme, “collapsed state” have also become fashionable (see Rotberg 2002).  
23 A frequently cited example is that of Nigeria, where the elite, belonging to the three largest ethnic groups (the 
Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba) and hundreds of smaller ones, have been continuously feuding for 
control of the state since the independence of the country. 
24 The politics of patronage was of course present in various Asian developmental states as well, most notably in 
Indonesia under Suharto. The main difference, however, according to Leftwich (1995), was that the ruling elite 
of Asian nations maintained a developmental focus, while in Africa the focus shifted to self-enrichment. Neo-
 
The state accordingly has enjoyed hardly any autonomous status within African countries. 
Instead, it was basically a captive of the rival elite. According to Callaghy (1987), the state in 
Africa became a “lame leviathan”, as it was so deeply penetrated by social groups that it was 
incapable of acting as an autonomous agent. Evans (1995) used the term “predatory state”, 
referring to the fact that the elites controlling the state used their power to serve their own 
special interests, regardless of the needs of society as a whole. Particular interests and the 
pressure for redistribution were strong and the state had little capacity to resist. In the 
extreme, satisfying the special interests and redistributional pressures coming from powerful 
groups in the society took up so much of the state’s resources that it hardly had any capacity 
left to fulfil its traditional roles, such as the provision of public goods and public services, 
including healthcare, education or basic sanitation (Rotberg 2002). 
 
A partial explanation for the presence of weak and captured states can be that most Sub-
Saharan African countries are (still) highly abundant in natural resources, especially when 
compared to East and Southeast Asia. In turn, state revenues depend heavily on the volatile 
global commodity prices. High commodity prices can lead to windfall export gains. As shown 
in the case studies collected in Collier – Gunning (1999), African countries have not been 
capable of countering strong redistributional pressures during times of such windfalls, and this 
has sowed the seeds of later crises and rising debt levels.25 The presence of such concentrated 
natural resource rents can also be an important incentive for rival elite groups to try and 
capture the state and divert these funds for their own use (Fearon 2005) and can thus partially 
explain the persistence of conflicts and coups in Africa.  
 
The difference between Asia and Africa, however, cannot be restricted to the different visions 
and autonomy of the ruling elite. Even if the ruling elite seem to have “enlightened” character, 
their decisions cannot be implemented without a competent and well trained administration, 
which is able to withstand societal pressures. As it was underlined earlier, the key component 
of the bureaucracy’s success in Asia was its (relative) autonomy. Relative, since state 
bureaucracy in a developmental state is hardly isolated; rather, it serves as a constructive 
channelling mechanism between the private sector and the decision makers (Evans 1995). It 
cannot be a big surprise, therefore, that the starkest contrast between the Asian developmental 
states and Sub-Saharan Africa is related to the power, competence and capacities of the state 
bureaucracy.  
 
On paper, most Sub-Saharan African countries had planning committees, ministries and other 
similar institutions with strong authority. In practice, however, these state organs were 
extremely weak, especially in comparison with their East Asian counterparts. They had no 
power and no capacity to execute decisions. Long term development plans were frequently 
overwritten by ad hoc decisions of the political elite. The bureaucracy was poorly trained, 
                                                                                                                                                        
patrimonial practices were closely related to corruption and rent-seeking, as they required funds which had to be 
siphoned away from the state. Corruption and rent-seeking, while clearly problems in Southeast Asian 
developmental states, also took a highly different nature in Africa. In Asia, corruption was a (temporary) by-
product of the authoritarian developmental state, and it did not inhibit economic growth to a large extent. In 
Africa, however, corruption and rent-seeking were sine qua non conditions for the system to function. See for 
example the case of Nigeria (Collier 2007:47-49). Using cross-country data, Easterly and Levine (1997) have 
shown that policies adopted by the state usually gave higher possibilities for rent-seeking activities in countries 
where the level of ethnic fragmentation was higher.  
25 See for example how Kenya squandered the earnings of the 1976-1979 coffee boom (Bevan – Collier – 
Gunning 1999), or what effects the various oil price shocks have had on the Nigerian politics (Eifert – Gelb – 
Tallroth 2002).  
incompetent and severely underpaid. Corruption within the bureaucracy, both petty and 
organised, was high. 
 
Well-trained staff was virtually non-existent in African bureaucracies.26 In contrast with Asia, 
where competence and a good educational background were indispensible for a public service 
career, in Africa no one in their right mind with such qualifications would have been willing 
to work for the government. Meritocratic hiring and promotion was totally absent. Rather, 
public service positions were used as an instrument of the elites to gain loyalty or reward 
supporters. According to Van de Walle (2001: 133), such “patronage exigencies led many 
governments to allow the excessively fast growth and africanisation of their administration”.27
 
Taking the interests of the ruling elite into account, it seems plausible to claim that a weak, 
untrained and unmotivated state bureaucracy was exactly what they were in need of. The 
elites did not want any kind of control with regard to their activities. Low state capacity could 
easily facilitate rent-seeking activities and corruption. The elite, therefore, might have 
intentionally strived to weaken the administration with low salaries, high payment arrears, bad 
working conditions, and by hiring and promoting incompetent cronies (Van de Walle 2001). 
The bureaucracies in typical Sub-Saharan African countries were, consequently, extremely far 
away from the insulated and professional state administrations of Asia, not to mention the 
Weberian ideals.  
 
A characteristic feature of African countries was that even various key ministries were unable 
to fulfil their roles. The Ministry of Finance could not safeguard the budget, as in many cases 
both revenues and expenditures were recorded off the budget. The Central Bank, instead of 
pursuing the basic goals of monetary policy, often served only as a banknote press machine. 
Still, a country cannot function without some sort of executive apparatus, and this was true 
even in the case of such dysfunctional states as the ones observed in Africa. As the executive 
head usually sought to centralise power, he built up a structure parallel to the state 
administration in the Office of the President, through which he tried to bypass the line 
ministries (Van de Walle 2001). This greatly undermined public administration as a whole, 
not to mention the waste of resources it caused. Furthermore, all this led to a paradox: while 
state bureaucracies were incompetent and highly inefficient, they were also very expensive 
due to bloated staffs, wasteful structures and corruption.28
 
In spite of the relative weakness of the state, it still managed to play some role in the 
formation of the private sector. At the time of independence, most Sub-Saharan African elites 
were heavily influenced by étatist development theories, which had a lasting effect on how 
they dealt with private capital, both foreign and domestic (Easterly 2005). Heavy state 
regulation, ad hoc interventions, state-owned companies and economic planning were all 
eagerly employed by these countries, all in the name of development. Foreign companies 
(mainly subsidiaries of multinationals active in the extractive industry) were nationalised in 
                                                 
26 At the turn of the new millennium, only three (!) trained accountants were employed in the entire Ugandan 
public sector (Van de Walle 2001: 131). 
27 Admittedly, the number of people working in state bureaucracies had seen extraordinary growth since 
independence in the African continent. Goldsmith (1999: 530), however, argued that the number of employees in 
the African public sector (as a percentage of the population) was not high in comparison with other developing 
nations. The problem, instead, lied in the fact that the African states never had ample resources (or the 
incentives) to pay these bureaucrats properly and in non-inflationary ways. 
28 Reforms that concentrate on numbers and downsizing exclusively (such as the ones usually prescribed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980’s and 1990’s) were certain failures, as they did not address the problems 
related to capacities and capabilities, not to mention the underlying reasons of bureaucratic weakness. 
the 1960s and 70s, which, together with excessive regulation and red tape, greatly deterred 
later foreign investments, at least until the 1990s. The activities of domestic private 
companies were also heavily curtailed, and the economy was dominated by state owned 
companies. These state owned companies, however, were extremely inefficient and wasteful.  
 
Patrimonialism was clearly present in the state-economy relations as well. The larger 
domestic private companies that did emerge were not the fruits of any deliberate private 
sector development strategy, but rather of discretional favours to buy support, such as 
granting import licences, access to foreign exchange, or various tax breaks. Small companies, 
on the other hand, were faced by high taxes, corruption and other bureaucratic burdens. Most 
domestic private entrepreneurs were, therefore, forced into illegality. In fact, it seems that the 
emergence of a powerful business elite was never in the interest of the political elite.  
 
 
5. Globalisation: changing state-society relations 
 
It is clear from the short analysis of the main characteristics of state-society relations in East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, that while in Asia the main determinants of success (i.e. state 
autonomy and state capacity) were present, in Africa they were missing from the start, and the 
elite intentionally made sure that these characteristics remain missing. Today however, due to 
globalisation, there is a markedly different international context than during the 1950s and 60s 
when the development paths of the two regions started to diverge notably. Due to economic 
globalisation, countries in all regions in the past decades have been forced to open their 
economies to international trade and international flows of capital. Globalisation also means 
freer flow of information, ideas, norms, and creates greater transparency. It is a commonplace 
that the state has lost much of its control over economic processes and economic actors 
operating within its territory. In Southeast Asia, the 1997 crisis clearly showed that the 
formerly almost omnipotent state has become incapable of influencing the economic situation 
in the country. The sustainability of the interventionist, visionary attitude of the 
developmental state has clearly come under stress.29
 
On the other hand, globalisation has a clear potential to change state-society relations in Sub-
Saharan Africa as well, creating probably a constellation that is more beneficial for 
development. As the current state-society complex seems to be some sort of low level 
equilibrium, it is plausible to assume that only some kind of external shock can incite lasting 
change. Even if we admit that the traditional model of the developmental state is no longer 
valid, that does not mean that changes in state-society relations in Africa would not be 
desirable. As the effects of globalisation are numerous, in the following we only review a few 
factors which can have an effect on state-society relations. 
 
Economic globalisation (and, to a lesser extent, pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions) 
has basically forced the Sub-Saharan African countries to deregulate and liberalise their 
economies to a significant extent. Import restrictions have been lifted to some extent and 
tariffs decreased in most countries (Ackah – Morrissey 2005). The economies have been 
opened up to foreign investments, and domestic enterprises also face fewer constraints than 
before. Foreign investors, mainly in the extractive, communications and financial sectors are 
increasingly present in Africa, and they demand stable political and policy environments. Due 
                                                 
29 See among others Benczes (2000) and Brownbridge – Kirkpatrick (1999). 
to these pressures, the ruling elite are forced to reform and have less scope to formulate 
policies that favour rent-seeking, patronage and corruption.  
 
The international pressure on non-democratic and badly governed countries is also increasing. 
During the Cold War, Western countries turned a blind eye on the “interior affairs” of African 
countries. Today, however, the advanced countries, together with the international 
organisations dominated by them, such as the EU, the OECD or the IMF and the World Bank, 
are increasingly demanding (explicitly or implicitly) that the Sub-Saharan African countries 
democratise their political regimes, implement good governance and good policy practices, 
increase governmental transparency, respect human rights and combat corruption. Developing 
countries with bad economic policies and non-democratic regimes receive less foreign aid 
than their peers with better policies (Dollar – Levin 2004). International initiatives like the 
Kimberly Process or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative are also forcing the 
elites into a straightjacket by not allowing them to use natural resource rents for their own 
goals. The fulfilment of international demands would undoubtedly decrease the space that the 
ruling elite have to manoeuvre in, and, by making rent-seeking more costly, it could thus 
force them to concentrate on starting economic growth instead. 
 
The question is: do these pressures of globalisation and the international community actually 
cause any significant changes in state-society relations in Sub-Saharan African countries? It is 
of course not easy to draw such conclusions, and a formal empirical study is out of the scope 
of our current paper. There are some encouraging signs at first sight, but a deeper scrutiny 
reveals a more ambiguous picture. In the past 20 years, a wave of democratisation has swept 
through Sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in the fact that a majority of the continent’s countries 
now have formally democratic regimes, in the Schumpeterian sense. Nevertheless, these new 
democracies in Africa are extremely fragile and very far from Western standards and retain 
many traits of the earlier authoritarian systems. Collier (2007) argues that while most African 
countries do introduce electoral competition, perhaps the most important formal element of 
democracy, they often fail to introduce checks and balances on the power of the executives. 
Without these control mechanisms, the ruling elite (even though they are elected more or less 
democratically) can still use state resources according to their will. They can use these 
resources to rig elections and are thus not forced to implement policies that benefit the 
society.  
 
But even electoral competition is far from perfect. Elections are mired in allegations of fraud, 
calls for boycotts, civil unrest and even armed conflict. Ethnic cleavages are highly visible in 
the results. The winning side usually fails to deliver on its promises. Thus, the legitimacy of 
the ruling elite is continuously questioned. Although they may have some amount of 
legitimacy among the members of their own ethnic group, but even this source may dwindle, 
if they fail to fulfil on their promises. Sensing their legitimacy decrease, the ruling elite turn to 
repression.30 The ruling elite continuously try to modify the laws of the country (even the 
constitution) to fit their interests.31 The peaceful transfer of the executive power is a rare event 
in these formally democratic countries. It is safe to assume that even though formal 
democratisation has occurred in many countries, state autonomy has not increased, as the elite 
still struggle to capture the state, although in a bit different setting. 
                                                 
30 A clear example of this vicious circle is the current conflict in the Niger-delta region. 
31 A frequent case is when the executive head of the country tries to modify the constitution to allow him more 
than two terms in office. The most recent case is that of Niger’s president, Mamadou Tandja, who was successful 
in granting himself the prospect of lifelong presidency, even though the European Union threatened to suspend 
foreign aid. 
 
It is even more difficult to identify changes related to state capacities which can be 
generalised to all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign aid donors are putting greater 
emphasis on helping recipient countries build bureaucratic capacity and improve public 
management. Still, between 1980 and 2001, bureaucratic quality in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
clearly declined (Knack – Rahman 2004), and it is difficult to find any evidence of 
improvements since then, even though many African countries have experienced large export 
earnings due to high global commodity prices.  
 
Summing up this section, in recent years, despite world economic and international pressures, 
the Sub-Saharan African elite seem to have found ways to maintain their earlier low level 
equilibrium system after some minor superficial changes. Behind this “window dressing”, 
there is clearly no significant improvement in state-society relations or in the motivations of 
the elite. Of course these preliminary conclusions maybe proven wrong, as there is large 
scope here for further research.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study we asked what were the main determining factors which enabled some countries 
to join the group of developed countries, while others failed in this quest. We have chosen the 
Asian developmental states and the Sub-Saharan African failed states in order to provide a 
plausible answer. Admittedly, several papers have already scrutinised the development paths 
of Asian and African countries. The novelty of our research project lies in the fact, however, 
that the two diverging performances were analysed within the same framework. Putting both 
the success and the failed stories into a single framework was not without reason: both groups 
of countries started their catching up from almost the same level of development. By applying 
the same set of concepts and methods, we managed to highlight the main differences between 
the two, i.e., the strengths of the Asian nations and the weaknesses of the Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
 
Moreover, the paper tried to combine the merits of both the society-centred approaches, which 
proved to be helpful in assessing the failed development attempts, and the state-centred 
explanations, which grasped the very essence of the success of developmental states. In turn, 
the main focus of our paper was on state autonomy, state capacity and more importantly, 
state–society relations. The paper argued accordingly that the great number of failures was not 
simply the result of failed public policies as neoclassical economics tended to argue, but the 
inappropriately interpreted role of the state, and the lack of knowledge and capacity for 
managing the development process – in short, the “weakness” of the state and the inadequacy 
of state–society relations. 
 
More concretely, we have shown that the prevalence of a strong state was the most important 
factor in explaining the success of those Southeast Asian countries which have managed to 
catch up to the advanced economies in the past decades. In the successful developmental 
regimes of East Asia, societal forces such as voters, lobbies, classes, etc. were never able to 
confront the state (or more precisely the ruling elite and the state administration) significantly. 
One of the sine qua non of developmental states was that it always managed to organise and 
control its society effectively (Chu 1989). On the other hand, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most 
important characteristics of a developmental state were entirely missing. In fact, it was the 
societal forces that controlled and shaped the state and public policy. The permanent battle 
between state and society caused the total paralysis of both entities and the brutal collapse of 
production (Luiz 2000). 
 
In the era of intensified globalisation, societies may gain some extra weight, thanks to the 
increased attention of NGOs and the media, but there are no signs for the emergence of a 
more robust state autonomy and state capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, as we have 
shown, the ruling elites have absolutely no interest in strengthening the state. More 
interestingly, globalisation may reshape state–society relations in developmental states, too, 
by increasing the influence of societal groups and devaluating the strength of the state. At the 
current level of development of East Asian nations, however, such a change might not 
necessarily result in a severe downfall; instead, this rearrangement may consolidate past 
results and pave the way for sustainable development, too. 
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